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Abstract: In Making it Explicit Robert Brandom claims that perspectivally hybrid
de re attitude ascriptions explainwhat an agent actually did, from the point of view
of the ascriber, whether or not that was what the agent intended to do. There is a
well-known problem, however, first brought to attention by Quine, but curiously
ignored by Brandom, that threatens to undermine the role of de re ascriptions in
the explanation of action, a problem that stems directly from the fact that, unlike
de dicto ascriptions, they permit the attribution of inconsistent attitudes to agents.
I propose a solution to the problem which I believe is consistent with Brandom’s
approach to the nature of intentionality and the explanation of action.
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1 De re and de dicto: BrandomandQuine onHybrid
Perspectivality
The social-inferentialist normative pragmatics of Robert Brandom’s Making it
Explicit (Brandom 1994—MIE hereafter) culminates in a final chapter that presents a
powerful account of the nature of propositional attitude attribution, in particular
belief ascription.1De re and de dicto attitude ascriptions are the core elements of this
account, figuring centrally in his inferentialist explanation of the representational
aspect of propositional content, inwhich its sociallyperspectival character forms the
basis for his theory of the explanation and assessment of intentional action.
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Brandom’s chief thesis is that “de re ascriptions are the fundamental representa-
tional locution of natural languages” (MIE, p. 499), because they say what beliefs
and other propositional attitudes are about, what they represent, what they are true
of—from the perspective of the ascriber, a perspective that might, importantly, be
disavowed by the subject of the ascription. As applied to intentional action, the
claim is that de re ascriptions explain what an agent actually did, from the point of
viewof theascriber,whether ornot thatwaswhat theagent intended todo. There is a
well-known problem, however, curiously ignored by Brandom, that threatens to
undermine the role of de re ascriptions in the explanation of action, a problem that
stems directly from the fact that, unlike de dicto ascriptions, they permit the attri-
bution of inconsistent contents to agents. I propose a solution which I believe is
consistent with Brandom’s ineliminably normative social-inferential approach to
meaning and intentionality.
As Brandom notes (MIE, p. 500), philosophical tradition distinguishes two
different styles or readings of propositional attitude attribution, de dicto ones and
de re ones. As the Latin terms indicate, de dicto ascriptions attribute belief in—or,
in Brandom’s preferred normative terminology, doxastic commitment to—a dictum
or saying or proposition, whereas de re ascriptions attribute belief about a res or
object. Canonically speaking, using Brandom’s regimentation, the dictum or
proposition believed in a de dicto ascription is reported by a ‘that’-clause, while in
a de re ascription the res or object of belief is singled out with an ‘of’-phrase.
Schematically, where t is singular term and ϕ is a predicate, one believes de dicto
that t is ϕ and believes de re, of t, that it is ϕ. For example,
DD Adams believes (de dicto) that the inventor of bifocals did not invent the lightening rod.
DRAdams believes (de re), of the inventor of bifocals, that he did not invent the lightening
rod.2
2 The examples are adapted from Brandom. Note that for reasons having to do with anaphor
playing a systematic role in Brandom’s expressivist inferential-substitutional account of semantic
notions, such as truth, reference and representation (see especially MIE, ch. 7), Brandom’s regi-
mentation of de re ascriptions employs anaphoric cross-reference: the content-specifying term is
“exported” to the wide scope of ‘of’ leaving behind an ascription-structural anaphoric dependent,
usually a pronoun, lyingwithin the narrow scope of ‘that’. But there are other ways of regimenting
de re ascriptions that do not employ anaphoric cross-reference between terms in ‘of’ and ‘that’
positions.DR can be phrased, for example, using infinitival constructions such as: ‘The inventor of
bifocals is believed by Adams to have invented the lightning rod’ or ‘The inventor of bifocals has
the property of being believed by Adams to have invented the lightning rod’. Quine often uses
infinitival forms. Perhaps this is because they are more naturally read as undertaking an onto-
logical commitment on the part of the ascriber to the existence of the res. This is something that
Brandom (mistakenly, in my view) rejects: according to him, aside from epistemically strong de re
ascriptions of object-dependent de re beliefs (MIE, ch. 8, §5), which are ontologically committing,
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But ‘that’ and ‘of’ do not merely serve to indicate, respectively, which proposition
is believed, in the de dicto case, andwhich object a belief is about, in the de re case.
They also serve—and this is the fundamental point of utmost importance for
Brandom—tomark an absolutely crucial distinction between the perspective of the
believer—what his doxastic commitments are—and that of the ascriber—what her
doxastic commitments are. More accurately, as we will see, it is the de dicto and
de re “portions” of de re ascriptions that reveal the essentially perspectival char-
acter of propositional content. This is why de re ascriptions, rather than de dicto
ones, are the primary representational locution (as one can see from DR above,
Brandom-style de re ascriptions, unlike de dicto ones, actually contain both
‘that’-clauses and ‘of’-phrases). For the socially perspectival distinctions they
mark form the very foundation for the deontic score-keeping intended to keep track
of the various deontic statuses—the doxastic, substitutional, practical and other
commitments and entitlements—involved in the kind of mutual understanding
and communication central to rational discourse and the explanation of rational
action so distinctive of sapient creatures.
Importantly, for Brandom, de dicto and de re do not serve to mark different
kinds of beliefs; rather, they mark different kinds of ascriptions in which the same
belief content or commitment is specified in different ways. A de dicto ascription
reports what the believer believes in a way that he would acknowledge as what he
believes. In Brandomese, it reportswhat the believer takes himself to be committed
to. This acknowledged commitment is what is reported in the ‘that’-clause of the
belief ascription. I believe this idea is best expressed by saying that the believer
accepts (or would accept, or is disposed to accept) the sentence (dictum) used to
report the content of his belief, that is, the ‘that’-clause. For instance, DD is war-
ranted only if the ascriber undertakes the commitment that Adams is committed to
accepting (or assenting to) the sentence ‘The inventor of bifocals did not invent the
lightening rod’—in other words, the ascriber must hold that Adams believes that
the ‘that’-clause is true. This is why the ‘that’-clauses of de dicto ascriptions are by
definition referentially opaque in Quine’s (1956) sense: co-referring expressions
de re ascriptions do not commit the ascriber to the existence of the res. For Brandom (but not for
Quine and not, I think, formost philosophers) it can be true that Ralph believes, of Pegasus, that he
has wings, and that he believes, of Vulcan, that it is a planet. To my ear, ontological non-
commitment is less plausible in ‘Pegasus has the property of being believed by Ralph to have
wings’. But this issue turns on further difficult matters, such as whether an object can have a
relational property involving an existing thing without itself existing, issues orthogonal to those
under discussion here. See also note 6 below.
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cannot necessarily be substituted salva veritate. We cannot necessarily substitute
‘Benjamin Franklin’ for ‘the inventor of bifocals’ in DD because Adams may well
not accept (or may even reject) the sentence ‘Benjamin Franklin did not invent the
lightening rod’, not realizing (or even denying) that Franklin is the inventor of
bifocals.
A de re ascription, however, freely characterizes what is believed in terms that
the believer may not recognize as something he believes, as something he is
committed to. So, unlike DD, DR can be true even if Adams does not accept the
sentence ‘The inventor of bifocals did not invent the lightening rod’. He might not
accept this sentence because he accepts the contradictory sentence ‘The inventor
of bifocals did invent the lightening rod’. Imagine, however, as before, that Adams
does not realize that Benjamin Franklin invented bifocals. Perhaps he even be-
lieves (de dicto) that Franklin did not invent them. Suppose further that Adams
does believe (de dicto) that Franklin did not invent the lightening rod. If the
ascriber is committed to the claim that Franklin is the inventor of bifocals, thenDR
is warranted. Indeed, any de re ascription formed from DR by substituting a sin-
gular term co-referential with ‘The inventor of bifocals’ is warranted. De re as-
criptions are, in Quine’s sense, referentially transparent: co-referring expressions
are substitutable salva veritate.
Brandom highlights a further essential feature of de re ascriptions, briefly
alluded to already, namely, that they contain a de dicto ‘that’-clause part in addition
to their overall de re ‘of’ form. De dicto ascriptions, by contrast, are purely de dicto.
What this means is that while de dicto ascriptions characterize reality from the point
of view of the believer, de re ascriptions characterize reality from the point of view of
both the ascriber and the believer. And that is the sense in which they have a
perspectival character: they report (a part of) the ascriber’s perspective on the world
and (apart of) the believer’s perspective on theworld inone overall attribution.More
specifically, in ade re attribution, the ascriber himself refers to someobject in reality,
other than thebeliever, and then sayswhat the believer believes about that object. In
short, as Brandom concisely summarizes it, de re specifications of conceptual con-
tent express “hybrid deontic attitudes” (MIE, p. 529).
This hybrid feature of de re ascriptions was emphasized by Quine several
decades after his classic 1956 paper ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes’,
which inaugurated modern discussion of the de dicto/de re distinction. In that
original paper Quine is concerned primarily with finding a (first order) logical
symbolization of quantified attitude attributions that ascribe what he called rela-
tional attitudes, such as ‘There is someonewhomAdams believes to have invented
the lightening rod’, without (by his lights) incoherently quantifying into a
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substitution-resistant and therefore referentially opaque position.3 Quine illus-
trates the problem with his famous story of Ralph and Ortcutt. Ralph has seen a
suspicious character in a brown hat lurking near a “sensitive installation” who he
thinks he is a spy. Ralph has also seen a grey-haired man at the beach who he
thinks is a pillar of the community and is known to him as ‘Bernard J. Ortcutt’.
Unbeknownst to Ralph, Ortcutt is both pillar and spy. Given this identity, Quine
then asks whether we can say of this man, Ortcutt himself, that Ralph believes him
to be a spy. For reasons that need not detain us here, a Yes answer was deemed
problematic byQuine.4 However, he admitted that we needed to be able to say this,
so he proposed a technical means for doing so that avoided the initial (alleged)
problems. Again, the details of the technical solution need not detain us here; we
need only note that Quine originally accepted the coherence of de re ascriptions,
such as
Ralph believes, of Ortcutt, that he is a spy.
At this time, however, he did notmakemuch of their hybrid perspectival character.
This came later. In Pursuit of Truth (1990) he begins by saying that in de dicto
ascriptions, the ‘that’-clauses (more accurately, his linguisticized versions of them)
“mark an opaque interface between two ontologies, two worlds: that of the man in
the attitude, however benighted, and that of our responsible ascriber of the atti-
tude” (pp. 69–70). He then goes on to say that in de re ascriptions
The interface is sometimes breached. Like an actor stepping out of his part and speaking for
himself, the ascriber is heard to say of the real people of his world that
(1) There are some whom Ralph believes to be spies, and not just that
(2) Ralph believes ‘∃x(x is a spy)’. (loc. cit.)
Quines continues by noting that “In affirming (1) we dissociate Ralph’s suspicions
from the world as he conceives it and train them upon denizens of our real world;
we ride roughshod over failures of identification.” Similar remarks occur in the
slightly later work From Stimulus to ScienceQuine (1995) where we find him saying
3 Quine’s well-known general thesis that ‘a position that resists substitutivity of identity cannot
meaningfully be quantified’ (1986a, p. 291) has been criticized by Kaplan (1986). As Forbes (1996)
has persuasively argued, however, ‘the cautious version of [Quine’s thesis] claims only that there is
a certain range of cases of substitution failure that involve a mechanism incompatible with
quantifying in’ and that ‘The puzzle is that although attitude ascriptions seem on general grounds
to belong to this range … we have the particular example of [‘There is someone whom Adams
believes to have invented the lightening rod’] to indicate otherwise’ (p. 338).
4 For the details, see Quine (1956), Kaplan (1968, 1986) and Crawford (2008).
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that the ‘that’-clause “marks the boundary between the ascriber’s impersonation of
the attitudinist and the ascriber’s speaking for himself” (p. 96), going on to note
that
Now and again, however, the ascriber interrupts his empathy and interjects reality, by his
own lights, into the attitudinist’sworld.He says there is someonewhomRalphbelieves to be a
spy; someone in the ascriber’s real world, irrespective of how Ralph’s attitudinal world may
be populated.… Ascriptions such as (1), which breach the barrier between the ascriber’s real
world and the fanciedworld of the attitudinist, are called ascriptions of propositional attitude
de re. The others are de dicto.
Under the influence ofRobert Sleigh, Saul KripkeandDavidKaplan, however, Quine
eventually came to viewde re ascriptionsashighlyproblematic. Thiswasbecausehe
took de re ascriptions to imply that the believer is acquainted or en rapportwith the
res—or “knows who” the res is—and he thought these epistemic notions were
ineliminably context-dependent and therefore not scientifically respectable.5
Whereas Quine takes a dim view of de re ascriptions, thinking them unsuitable for
serious science, and advocates instead what he takes to be a context-independent
and scientifically respectable linguisticized version of de dicto ascriptions, Brandom
views the barrier breach—the hybrid perspectivality—characteristic of de re ascrip-
tions as precisely what makes them the suitable cornerstone for an irreducibly
normative score-keeping practice of attributing and acknowledging deontic sta-
tuses, in particular doxastic and practical commitments.
In any propositional attitude ascription there is always a commitment attrib-
uted and one undertaken. In a de dicto ascription, a doxastic commitment is
attributed to the believer, or “attitudinist” in Quine’s parlance, by the ‘that’-clause
of the ascription. But since the whole ascription is a claim by the ascriber, the
ascriber undertakes the commitment that the ascription is true (of course, the
ascriber may also share the believer’s commitment too but this is not something
communicated in the ascription itself).6
5 I agree with Brandom that this is a mistake based on not distinguishing between epistemically
strong de re ascriptions, involving demonstrative or indexical modes of acquaintance with the res,
and ordinary epistemically weak or purely denotational de re ascriptions (MIE, ch. 8, §5; AR,
p. 172), but that is another story I tell elsewhere (Crawford 2008).
6 Here it is worth pointing out another difference with Quine. Brandom does not view ordinary
(weak, denotational) de re ascriptions as ontologically committing the ascriber to the existence of
the res, though he does view special epistemically strong ones as existentially committing. See
note 2 above. Unfortunately, Brandomdoes not discuss the kind of quantified de re ascriptions that
initially interested Quine and that he originally dubbed relational and with whose hybrid per-
spectivality he was most concerned, such as ‘There is someone whom Ralph believes to be a
spy’/‘Ralph believes, of someone, that he is a spy’. Again, to my ear, both of these—with and
without the anaphoric structure (see note 1 above)—sound ontologically committing. Brandom’s
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But the attributing-and-undertaking feature present in de re ascriptions is
more interesting and important to mutual understanding and communication—
and is the aspect of Brandom’s inferentialism that purports to recover the repre-
sentational dimension of propositional content. For de re ascriptions report what,
from the ascriber’s point of view, the believer’s belief is about, thereby enabling the
ascriber to determine whether, by his lights, what the believer believes is true. If I
do not know anything about the inventor of bifocals (maybe I do not even know
what a bifocal is) then I am not in a position to assess whether Adams’s belief as
reported inDD is true. But if someone tells me, say, that Franklin is the inventor of
bifocals (something, as we supposed previously, that Adamsmay not know ormay
even deny), then I can form the de re ascription:
Adams believes, of Franklin, that he did not invent the lightening rod,
and thereby say (“like an actor stepping out of his part”) of whomAdams holds his
belief, that is, who his belief is about, who it represents as not having invented the
lightening rod. If I also happen to think that I know that Franklin did in fact invent
the lightening rod, then my breaching of the barrier between my and Adams’s
worlds enables me to assess Adams’s claim as (by my lights) false, that is, as a
claim that is false of Franklin. Here, in addition to attributing a commitment to
Adams with the de dicto ‘that’-clause portion, namely, that he believes someone
did not invent the lightening rod, a commitment (or at least a known implication of
a commitment) that Adams acknowledges, I undertake, in the de re ‘of’ portion, a
commitment about who this belief of Adams’s is about, namely, that it is a belief
about Franklin, which is a commitment that Adams himself may not acknowledge
andmay even deny. So Brandom speaks of the “de re or undertaking position” and
the “de dicto or attributing position” of de re ascriptions (MIE, p. 516), concluding
that “the marking of portions of the content-specification of a propositional atti-
tude ascription into de dicto and de re portionsmakes explicit the essential deontic
scorekeeping distinction of social perspective between commitments attributed
and those undertaken” (AR, p. 178).7
failure to discuss quantified de re attitude ascriptions—a notable lacunae in his account—is partly
owed, I think, to his conflation (in MIE, p. 548) of the de dicto/de re distinction with Quine’s
distinction between relational and notional belief (a common conflation exposed in Crawford
2008).
7 In Brandom’s later workTales of theMighty Dead (2002) this deontic score-keeping account of de
dicto and de re specifications of conceptual content is carried over (with a further species of de
traditione ascription) into the Gadamerian hermeneutic enterprise of dialogically interpreting
historical philosophical texts, though that extension will not concern us here, as it does not
directly concern action. Brandom’s conception of the de re/de dicto distinction also appears in his
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2 Action Explanation
With this framework behind us, let us now turn to the explanation and assess-
ment of intentional action. Brandom’s basic idea here is that “de dicto and de re
ascriptions underwrite two different kinds of intentional explanation” (MIE,
p. 522; cf. Crawford 2012). De dicto ascriptions ascribe contents from the
perspective of the agent and so are thereby able to rationalize (in Davidson’s 1980
sense) actions. In Brandomese, de dicto ascriptions state the agent’s commit-
ments, doxastic and otherwise, in a way that he or she would acknowledge and
recognize as forming part or all of his or her reasons for performing an action.
Accordingly, de dicto ascriptions are suited to explain what an agent is trying to
do, in a sense that he would acknowledge as what he is trying to do. De re
ascriptions, on the other hand, as we have seen, ascribe contents from the point
of view of the ascriber, and express the ascriber’s commitments, which are not
necessarily attributed by the ascriber to the agent of the ascription. De re as-
criptions, accordingly, explain why actions turn out as they do, what an agent
actually does, from the ascriber’s perspective—and these are actions under de-
scriptions which the agent may not recognize as descriptions of his or her actions
and therefore for which he or shemay not have reasons for performing. Wemight
put it this way. Rationalising psychological explanations explain actions under
descriptions under which they are intentional—and it seems apt to call such
actions tryings, for they are what the agent is trying, attempting, intending to do,
or aiming at. These are the kinds of explanations that wholly invoke agents’
reasons, and hence, the de dicto attribution of beliefs, desires and intentions.
There are also psychological explanations for actions under descriptions under
which they are not intentional; such explanations do not wholly invoke agents’
reasons for doing what they do, so it seems apt to call such actions doings,
because they are still actions, just not intentional ones. Summing up, in my own
Brandomian terminology, de dicto ascriptions explain tryings and de re ascrip-
tions explain doings. Accordingly, we can speak of de dicto and de re explanation
of action.8
recent A Spirit of Trust. A Reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology (Brandom 2019, passim), where it is
sometimes applied to certain kinds of actions, but again these applications to specifically Hegelian
themes are not relevant here.
8 This brief account of de dicto and de re explanation of action, and the distinction between
tryings and doings, is set out in much greater detail in Crawford (2012). It is important to note,
however, that there can be, in a perfectly legitimate sense of ‘try’, de re ascriptions of what agents’
try to do. See note 9 below for further discussion.
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Taking one of Brandom’s own examples as an illustration, we may seek to
explain why Nicole shot the animal in front of her. The explanation (somewhat
elliptical) might be: she wanted to shoot a deer and believed (de dicto) that the
animal in front of her was a deer. This ascription specifies the conceptual content
of Nicole’s belief from her perspective, that is, in a way that she would
acknowledge as something that she is committed to. Alas, we can well imagine
that, as luckwould have it, the animal in front of her was unfortunately not a deer
but a cow, so that, as Brandom says, “Shooting a deer is something she was trying
to do but failed” (MIE, p. 524). Although she succeeded in shooting the animal in
front of her, she failed to do what she ultimately wanted or aimed to do by
shooting the animal in front of her, namely, shoot a deer; what she actually did,
what she ended up doing by shooting the animal in front of her, was shoot a cow.
Her shooting the animal in front of her had the unintended consequence that she
shot a cow, and as Brandom has reminded us (MIE, p. 523) of what Davidson
(1980) reminded us of, our actions can be re-described in terms of their unin-
tended consequences. So Nicole did shoot a cow. Now, given that she wanted to
shoot a deer, why did she end up shooting a cow? We can’t explain this action of
hers wholly in terms of her own acknowledged doxastic and practical commit-
ments, wholly in de dicto terms, because it was not something she was trying to
do, that shewas aiming at, that she had reason to do. The only way to explain this
action of hers is to ascribe to her a belief in the de re style and to say that she
(mistakenly) believed, of the cow that she shot, that it was a deer. As Brandom
puts it “That Nicole’s belief that the animal in front of her was a deer was a belief
of a cow that it was a deer in front of her is just what is needed to explain why
Nicole shot a cow” (MIE, pp. 523–24).9
9 As mentioned in note 8, it is of course perfectly acceptable to say, in a de re attribution, that
Nicole tried to shoot a cow (because she thought it was a deer), or that a cow was such that Nicole
tried to shoot it (cf. ‘Can youbelieve it?Oedipus tried tomarry his ownmother!’). These are (true)de
re ascriptions of what Nicole was trying (or attempting) to do from the point of view of those who
are “in the know” (though they do not take exactly Brandom’s canonical form), but they are not
descriptions of Nicole’s trying, in my Brandomian technical sense, which would require a de dicto
ascription. One might say that tryings in the technical sense, for which de dicto explanations are
necessary, are the ways agents self-consciously represent the aim of their action to themselves.
(I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this way of putting it and for helpful
comments pressing me to clarify this issue.) We can call these de dicto tryings. Of course, what
agents try to do, in this sense, that is, de dicto tryings, can be re-described in ways that agents do
not recognize as representing their aim or in ways that show that their represented aim cannot in
fact bemet by doing what they are doing, as in the case of Nicole (and Oedipus)—or a time traveler
unknowingly trying (de re) to kill his younger self. Cf. the distinction between de dicto and de re
tryings drawn by Smith (1997, pp. 379–80) in the context of a discussion of time travel.
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3 De re Explanation: The Problem of Near
Contraries
De re explanation has, however, been widely denigrated by philosophers (see, e.g.,
Boghossian 1994; Carruthers 1988; Dennett 1982; Fodor 1980; Grandy 1986; Lycan
1985; Schiffer 1978, but especially Baker 1982), although Brandomnowhere registers
this.10 The problem with de re ascriptions is supposed to be that, while de dicto
ascriptions are bound by normative principles of rationality (emphasized and
argued for most famously by Davidson 1980, 1984 and Dennett 1987), which pro-
scribe the attribution of inconsistent contents (at least ceteris paribus), de re as-
criptions regularly violate them, and therefore, unlike de dicto ascriptions, license
the attribution of inconsistent contents (Baker 1982; Dennett 1982; Quine 1956). That
de dicto ascriptions are attributed on the basis of the so-called “assumption of
rationality” is clear from the fact that in order for de dicto ascriptions to be true of a
believer, he must acknowledge commitment to their ‘that’-clauses and no sincere
and competent languageuserwhounderstands a series of sentences (andwho is not
tired, ill, distracted, intoxicated or otherwise incapacitated) accepts them if they are
inconsistent (and not too long and complicated). The “assumption of rationality”
governing de dicto ascriptions of belief arguably derives from the fact that speaking
logically is part of what it is to speak competently (Crawford 2012). As Quine says,
“we learn logic in learning language” Quine (1986, p. 100). Since the only de dicto
ascriptions of belief that canbe true of an individual are thosewhose content clauses
correspond to the sentences he accepts qua competent speaker of a language, and
being a competent speaker of a languagemeans by and large abiding by basic rules
of logic, the only de dicto ascriptions that can be true of an individual are those
whose content clauses conform to the basic rules of logic.
That things are very differentwith de re ascriptions ismade evident byQuine in
the rest of the passage quoted above:
He [the ascriber] says there is someone whom Ralph believes to be a spy; someone in the
ascriber’s real world, irrespective of how Ralph’s attitudinal world may be populated. He
declares that
∃x(Ralph believes that x is a spy),
thus affirming the existence, in the real world, of a suspect in Ralph’s world. How the cross-
identification? Maybe there are two people whom Ralph has taken to be one. Maybe there is
one whom he has taken to be two, suspecting the one while trusting the other. A virtue of our
10 I discuss Baker’s challenging argument in detail and defend de re explanation against it in
Crawford (2021).
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[linguisticized de dicto] treatment was that it sealed off the two worlds, obviating such
collision of incompatible ontologies” (loc. cit.).
As we have seen, it is precisely the seamlessness of de re ascriptions, with their
cross-identification, that is so fundamental for Brandom. But, as Quine notes, this
seamlessness makes de re ascribers’ cross-identifications subject to ontological
collision, which brings in its wake inconsistency on the part of the attitudinist. The
latter type of collision—taking one thing to be two—is in fact the situation in
Quine’s original story of Ralph and Ortcutt. According to it, the following de dicto
ascriptions are true:
(1) Ralph believes that the man in the brown hat is a spy
(2) Ralph believes that the man at the beach is not a spy
(3) Ralph believes that the man at the beach is a pillar of the community.
This is because Ralphwould acknowledge his commitment to the truth of the three
‘that’-clauses. The ascriber-cum-deontic-score-keeper, however, is committed to
the identity:
the man in the brown hat = the man at the beach = Ortcutt,
which Ralph would not acknowledge as a commitment. Together with (1) and (2),
the identity bringswith it various substitution-inferential commitments on the part
of the ascriber-score keeper, which include the de re ascriptions:
(4) Ralph believes, of Ortcutt, that he is a spy
(5) Ralph believes, of Ortcutt, that he is not a spy.
Brandom, of course, is perfectly aware of this feature of de re ascriptions. InMIE he
notes at one point, in passing, that “Certainly in the de re sense, one can believe of
Benjamin Franklin, as the inventor of bifocals, that he did not invent the lightning
rod, and also believe of Benjamin Franklin, as the inventor of the lightning rod,
that he did invent the lightning rod” (p. 576). But he fails to note that this poses a
potential threat to the role that hewants to give de re ascriptions in the explanation
of doings.
Quine (1956) originally called such de re ascriptive collisions, inwhich someone
believes of a, that it is F and believes of a that it is not F, “near contraries.” In such
cases, we have a single object to which a person unknowingly predicates two
incompatible properties. In the above quotation,Quinementionsa secondkindofde
re collision, one that involves two (or more) objects to each of which a person
unknowingly predicates, inconsistently, a single uniquely instantiated property.
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Examples of this kind of collision (see Baker 1982; Crawford 2021; Dennett 1987) can
involve an individual who thinks, of one thing a, that it is the only F, and thinks of
another thing b (where a≠b), that it is the only F. Another type of case is where a
person thinks ofa, that it is themore F or themost F, and thinks ofb (wherea≠b), that
it is the more F or the most F, where F is an adjective such as ‘beautiful’ or ‘valuable’.
The presence of these ontological collisions in the perspectivally hybrid de re idiom
is seen by its detractors as displaying so much confusion on the part of the atti-
tudinist—even if it is entirely rational confusion—that it renders de re ascriptions
unsuitable for the explanation and prediction of action.
Here I will only consider the first type of near contrary where someone mis-
takes one thing for two, an example of which is of course Ralph and Ortcutt.11
Suppose Ralph, a fanatical patriot, tries to shoot theman in the brown hat because
hewants (de dicto) to kill a spy andbelieves (de dicto) that theman in the brownhat
is a spy. NowRalph alsowants (de dicto) not to shoot Ortcutt, because he thinks (de
dicto) that he is pillar of the community. But, according to our ontological com-
mitments, Ortcutt is the man in the brown hat and so we may wish to explain why
Ralph shot Ortcutt. According to Brandom, the explanation is that Ralph believed,
of Ortcutt, that hewas a spy. The samede re ascription presumablymust be used by
an ascriber to predict that Ralphwill shoot Ortcutt. The alleged problemwith this is
that Ralph also believed, of Ortcutt, that he was not a spy. As soon as we dissociate
our ascription from the denizens of Ralph’s ontology and train it upon those of
ours, and indulge in cross-identification, aswe dowith de re ascriptions, we run up
against the fact that Ralph has inconsistent attitudes towards the things he acts on.
How can our de re attribution to Ralph, of the belief, of Ortcutt, that he is a spy,
explain Ralph’s shooting him—or enable us to predict that he will shoot him—
when we’re also committed to the claim that he also believes, of him, that he is not
a spy?
Shifting from assassination to hunting, it is an easy matter to put Nicole in a
similar situation, in which she not only believes, of the cow she shot, that it is a
deer, but also believes, of that same cow, that it is not a deer, perhaps because it is
her cow and she (obviously) believes (de dicto) that her cow is not a deer. But, then,
how can her belief of it that it is a deer explain her shooting it, as Brandom claims it
does—or enable us to predict that shewill shoot it—when she also believes of it that
it is not a deer? Notice too that Ralph and Nicole will have, from the de re score-
keeper’s point of view, all sorts of inconsistent intentions and desires. Ralph, for
11 I discuss the other type of near contrary case, where two objects are mistaken for one, in the
general context of action explanation, in Crawford 2021, where the solution proposed below is
shown to apply to it too.
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example, will intend, of the man in the brown hat, that he shoot him. But he will
also intend, of theman in the brown hat, that he not shoot him (because he intends
de dicto not to shoot Ortcutt the pillar). Nicole will intend of the cow, that she shoot
it. But shemaywell also intend, of the cow, that she not shoot it (because the cow is
hers and she intends (de dicto) not to shoot her own cow12). By flouting the
assumption of rationality that governs de dicto ascriptions, de re ascriptions make
a mess of the believer’s cognitive life and therefore the explanation and prediction
of their behavior seemingly impossible. At least so argue the de re denigrators, who
press hard this objection from near contraries. It turns out, however, that they are
hoist on their own petard, for it is, ironically, the very logical laxity of the de re
idiom that is the key to answering the objection.
4 The Solution: De re Logical Fragmentation
Implies Explanatory Independence
To see this, we need to note a crucial feature of de re ascriptions that Quine (1956)
took pains to point out in his original discussion, something that Brandom fails to
mention. Quine noted that (4) and (5) do not make Ralph out to be irrational
because they do not entail
(6) Ralph believes, of Ortcutt, that he is a spy and he is not a spy.
Although he does not discuss the issue (so far as I am aware) Brandom would
certainly agree with Quine about this. For in order for (6) to be true, Ralph would
have to be committed to the truth of the de dicto ‘that’-clause portion and so assent
to the sentence ‘he is a spy and he is not a spy’ taking both pronouns to co-refer—
and Ralph obviously does not do this. To put it another way, since, in Brandom’s
words, “behind every de re ascription there must be a de dicto ascription,” and
there is not one in this case, (6) cannot be true. Generally speaking, according to
Brandom, any ascriber committed to the claim that S believes of t that ϕ(it), is
committed to there being some t′ such that t = t′ and S believes that ϕ(t′). Since
Ralph is by hypothesis rational and no rational person believes that ϕ(t) & ∼ϕ(t),
(6) cannot be true.
We need not rely on examples involving inconsistent beliefs. For it is clear in
Ralph’s case that although
12 Maybe it is a dairy cow.
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(7) Ralph believes, of Ortcutt, that he is the man at the beach.
and
(8) Ralph believes, of Ortcutt, that he is the man in the brown hat.
are both true (by our lights) it is not true that
(9) Ralph believes, of Ortcutt, that he is the man at the beach and the man in the brown hat.
For imagine that someone tells Ralph that theman he sawat the beach is themanhe
saw in the brown hat. This should be shocking news to Ralph. But if (9) is already
true because (7) and (8) are true then it cannot be news at all to Ralph. Since the
details of Quine’s story license (7) and (8), and the subjunctive that if Ralph were to
becomeapprised of the fact that the sentence ‘Theman is the brownhat is themanat
the beach’ is true, then he would learn something new, (9) cannot be true.13
Generally speaking, we can say that a commitment to the claims that S believes,
of t, that it is ϕ, and that S believes, of t, that it is ψ, does not bring with it a
commitment to the claim that S believes, of t, that it is bothϕ andψ. Thede re idiom,
wemight say, violates Doxastic Conjunction Introduction (DCI). The de dicto idiom,
on the other hand, arguably abides byDCI. S’s believing that t isϕ and S’s believing
that t isψwould seem to imply that S believes that t isϕ andψ. After all, the truth of
the de dicto ascriptions, S believes that t isϕ and S believes that t isψ, is a sufficient
condition for S’s accepting sentences of the form £t is ϕ· and £t is ψ·. But if S
accepts—or is disposed to accept—the sentences£t isϕ· and£t isψ· then it is hard
to see how S could fail to accept—or fail to be disposed to accept—the sentence £t is
ϕ andψ·, after due consideration of it, so long as Sunderstands both occurrences of
£t· to co-refer and is a competent speaker of the language (understands, for
example, what ‘and’ means) and is not tired, ill, distracted, and so on.
The failure ofDCImeans, I submit, that near contrary de re ascriptions, such as
(4) and (5), stand logically fragmented—or compartmentalised or partitioned—from
each other, and hence, are explanatorily independent, that is, can be legitimately
employed separately in different explanatory contexts despite being simulta-
neously true in all contexts. De re detractors abstract de re ascriptions from the
contexts in which they become true and thereby fail to distinguish which among
them is explanatorily relevant to the context of action at hand.
The de re ascriptions (4) and (5) become true—i.e., the beliefs reported are
formed—in two different contexts or circumstances: one in which Ortcutt is pre-
sented to Ralph as the man in the brown hat and one in which he is presented as
Ortcutt the grey-haired pillar at the beach. Ralph performs his shooting in only one
13 Cf. Dummett 1978, 1975 (Appendix).
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of these contexts, namely, the former. The ascriber can use (4) to explain (and
predict) Ralph’s shooting Ortcutt because he knows that the context of belief
formation, in which (4) became true, is the same as the context of action in which
Ralph’s shooting is taking place. Indeed, all the various cases of mistaken identity
that have paraded through the philosophical literature that appear to confound de
re explanation—Ralph and Ortcutt, Hesperus and Phosphorus, Superman and
Clark Kent, H2O and XYZ, etc.—turn on the protagonists not recognizing something
as something they believe to have a certain property because of a disparity between
the original context of belief fixation in which the de re ascriptions true of them
became true of them and the new context of their subsequent actions. This in-
dicates that the reason why we know just what these protagonists are going to do,
and so can explain their doings with de re ascriptions, must have something
essentially to dowith our knowledge of the context of belief formation inwhich the
de re ascriptions became true and the context inwhich their subsequent actions are
taking place, and the relation between them.
In short, the answer to the question of how Ralph’s belief, of Ortcutt, that he is
a spy, can explain his shooting him if he also believes, of Ortcutt, that he is not a
spy, is that (4) is relevant to an explanation of Ralph’s shooting Ortcutt in a context
in which the latter is wearing the brown hat because it became true—i.e., the belief
reported was formed—in a context in which Ortcutt was wearing the brown hat.
The fact that (5) is also true of Ralph in that context—even as he is shooting Ortcutt
—has no bearing on an explanation of Ralph’s action because (5) did not become
true (the belief reported was not formed) in a context in which Ortcutt was wearing
the brown hat. Since (5) became true (the belief reported was formed) in a context
in which Ortcutt was presented to Ralph as the man at the beach, it is not relevant
to an explanation of his shooting Ortcutt in a context in which Ortcutt is wearing
the brownhat. The same applies,mutatismutandis, tomyQuinean “near contrary”
version of Brandom’s story of Nicole and her cow.14
We can make more precise the idea that it is the relation between contexts of
action and contexts of belief formation that renders some de re ascriptions
explanatorily relevant and others explanatorily irrelevant by drawing on Sosa and
Pastin’s (1981) concepts of motivating and locating properties. Speaking de dicto,
Ralph believes that the suspicious man in the brown hat is a spy. He says as much.
Indeed, he says more: he says that the next time he sees the suspicious man in the
brown hat he will shoot him. So, the property of Ortcutt that motivates Ralph to
shoot him is the having-the-suspicious-man-in-the-brown-hat appearance. This is
not enough actually to get Ralph to shoot Ortcutt, however. He also needs to locate
Ortcutt on the basis of that motivating property. After all, there is Ralph talking to
14 I leave this as an exercise for the reader.
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Ortcutt on the beach and telling him that the next time he sees the man in the
brownhat he is going to shoot him. Ralph’s problem is that he ismotivated to shoot
Ortcutt on the basis of a property that does not locate Ortcutt for him. When he is
talking to Ortcutt on the beach the property that locates Ortcutt for him is having-
the-man-at-the-beach appearance. So there is a property of Ortcutt that motivates
Ralph to shoot him, and a property of Ortcutt that locates him for him to shoot, but
the properties are not the same; nor are they connected by Ralph to the same
individual, that is, to Ortcutt. For Ralph to shoot Ortcutt, there needs to be either a
single property of Ortcutt that both motivates Ralph to shoot him and that locates
him for shooting (e.g., having-the-suspicious-man-in-the-brown-hat appearance),
or separate motivating and locating properties or near correlates of them (e.g.,
having-the-suspicious-man-in-the-brown-hat appearance andhaving-the-man-at-
the-beach appearance—or simply being-the-suspicious-man-in-the-brown-hat
and being-the-man-at-the-beach) need to be connected by Ralph to Ortcutt.15 So far
in the story, Ralph will shoot Ortcutt only when he sees him acting suspiciously in
the brown hat because only this property both motivates and locates Ortcutt for
him to shoot. So he will not shoot him at the beach. But, were Ralph to become
apprised—either through tracking Orcutt’s movements from the sensitive instal-
lation to the beach while witnessing his change of clothes, or by way of others’
testimony, or perhaps byway of his ownmemory—that theman in the brown hat is
the man at the beach, then he would shoot Ortcutt at the beach. This is because,
although the property that motivates him to shoot Ortcutt (being-the-suspicious-
man-in-the-brown-hat) is not the same property that locates him for shooting
(being-the-man-at-the-beach) Ortcutt would at that time be believed by him to
have the conjunctive property of being-the-suspicious-man-in-the-brown-hat-
and-the-man-at-the-beach. In this situation, he will shoot Ortcutt at the beach on
the basis of a motivating property that is distinct from a locating property because
the two have become connected in his mind with the same individual.
The idea of amotivating property is another way of describing the relevance of
the context of belief fixation to action on the basis of belief; the idea of a locating
property is another way of describing the relevance of the context of action to
action on the basis of belief. For an agent to act on an object at a certain time that
object must present some property to the agent that both locates the object for him
to act on at that time andmotivates him to act on it at that time (or different locating
andmotivating propertiesmust be connected by the agent to the object in question
at the time of action via identity judgements formed through tracking, testimony,
15 I am here again indebted to the aforementioned anonymous reviewer for insightful comments
that prompted the more explicit addition of the second disjunct as sufficient for action.
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recognition or memory). A property of an object becomes a motivating property in
the context of belief formation. This is what has happenedwith Ralph: it is with the
advent of (4) that having-the-suspicious-man-in-the-brown-hat appearance be-
comes a motivating property for Ralph. If this motivating property is to lead Ralph
to shoot Ortcutt then it must also be a locating property (or become connected with
one). It is when thismotivating property becomes a locating property (or connected
with one) that action occurs and Ralph shoots Ortcutt. When the context of action
is one in which Ortcutt is wearing a brown hat and skulking around a sensitive
installation, then of the two locating properties, having-the-suspicious-man-in-
the-brown-hat appearance and having-the-man-in-at-the-beach appearance, only
the former is also a motivating property (and the properties are not connected). So
only (4) is relevant to an explanation of Ralph’s shooting.
One question that remains, however, is how to individuate the “contexts” to
which appeal has been made, together with the logical fragmentation of de re
belief ascriptions, to solve the problem of near contraries. I have said that the
reason why Ralph does not shoot Ortcutt when he sees him at the beach—even
thoughhe believes, of him, that he is a spy—is that this context of action is different
from the context of belief formation in which the de re ascription that he believes,
of Ortrcutt, that he is a spy, becomes true. But on what ground can I claim this?
What explains why this is a different context, other than the fact that he does not
shoot Ortcutt in it—which is the very thing to be explained? The answer, I suggest,
lies in the fact that Ralph has lost track of Ortcutt: he loses track of him between the
time when he sees him in the brown hat and the time when he sees him at the
beach. So contexts are to be individuated by appeal to the (philosophically
speaking, primitive) notion of keeping track of an object through space and time. A
subject moves into a different context with respect to an object when he loses track
of that object, that is, fails continuously to perceive or otherwise know about
(through recognition, testimony or memory, for example) the object’s change of
location and/or appearance.16 Ralph might have perceptually tracked Ortcutt
throughout the period in which his appearance changed from being a suspicious
man in a brown hat to being a pillar at the beach. In such a situation the context of
action and the context of belief formationwould be one and the same and so Ralph
would have shot Ortcutt when he saw him at the beach. To put it in terms of the
notion of amotivating property, if Ralph had kept track of Ortcutt by perceiving his
changes in appearance and location, then another property of Ortcutt would have
become a motivating property for Ralph, namely, having-the-pillar-at-the-beach-
16 See Evans (1981, 1982) for more extensive discussion about how spatial and temporal tracking
figures in information-based thought, a discussion which is not only congenial to the treatment
given here but was the inspiration for the appeal to tracking as a way of individuating contexts.
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appearance. In this situation Ralphwould have shot Ortcutt at the beach and so his
context of action and his context of belief formationwould not have diverged in the
way they did in Quine’s original story. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to
Brandom’s Nicole and her cow.
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